学术视界 | 企业与政府在共享单车系统中的冲突

Original Yang,H.,Hu,Y.M等数字经济与商业模式 2023-03-28

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Conflicts between business and government in bike sharing system

企业与政府在共享单车系统中的冲突

Article in International Journal of Conflict Management · April 2020

作者

Hong Yang

Sino-Danish College, University of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

Yimei Hu

Department of Business and Management, Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark

Han Qiao

School of Economics and Management, University of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

Shouyang Wang

Academy of Mathematic and Systems Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

Feng Jiang

Hangzhou Dianzi University, Hangzhou, China

摘要

研究目的：本文研究目的是阐述一种新兴的商业模式——共享经济在监管过程中企业与政府之间的互动冲突。以共享单车系统为研究对象，探讨共享单车公司和政府监管之间的冲突处理策略。研究方法：本文引入演化博弈模型说明共享单车企业与政府监管之间的互动冲突，并结合系统动力学（SD）模拟两个局中人冲突处理策略的演化。研究结果：研究观察了博弈双方的动态策略，在5种条件下，冲突结果是演化稳定状态。仿真结果表明，冲突处理策略是一种折衷模式，双方都要牺牲自己的部分利益，并根据对方的利益调整策略。此外，共享单车企业的策略对低生产质量自行车的额外运营维护成本以及积极监管成本很敏感，这为监管部门提供了理论指导。独创性及价值：无站位共享单车是近年来在我国兴起的一种新型的创业模式，是创业研究的一个重要研究领域。由于该现象的独特性和新颖性，在监管过程中存在着冲突和挑战。因此，本研究对共享经济背景下企业与政府的冲突处理策略具有一定的实践意义。在方法论层面，作为一个缺乏可用数据进行实证研究的新问题，本研究将演化博弈论与可持续发展理论相结合，以阐明企业与政府之间的复杂互动，本研究方法可应用于其他创业研究。
Research Summary:

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to elaborate on the interactive conflicts between business and governmental authorities in the regulatory process of an emerging business model: sharing economy. Focusing on bike sharing system, the study also investigates the conflict-handling strategy of bike sharing companies and government regulation.

Design/methodology/approach – An evolutionary game model is introduced to illustrate the interactive conflict between bike sharing companies and government regulation, combined with system dynamics (SD) to simulate the evolutionary conflict-handling strategies between the two players.

Findings – The dynamic strategies of the two players are observed, and under five conditions the conflict outcomes are evolutionary stable states. Simulations show that each party sacrifices part of its interest and adjust its strategy according to that of the other, indicating the conflict-handling strategy as a compromising mode. Furthermore, the strategies of bike sharing companies are sensitive to additional operation and maintenance costs for producing low-quality bicycles and costs of positive regulation, which provides theoretical guidance for regulatory authorities.

Originality/value – The station-less bike sharing come up in China recently, and it is an important research field of entrepreneurship. Owing to the uniqueness and novelty of the phenomenon, conflicts and challenges exist during the regulation process. Thus, the study practically contributes to the conflict-handling strategies of businesses and government under the context of sharing economy. Methodologically, as a novel issue with less available data to carry out empirical research, this study combines evolutionary game theory with SD to shed light on the complex interactions

关键词

系统动力学，冲突管理，政府规制，共享单车，演化博弈模型

Keywords: System dynamics, Conflict management, Government regulation, Bike sharing, Evolutionary game model

讨论与结论

本研究将互动冲突解决过程视为一个复杂系统，运用进化博弈论分析了双方的动态互动。SD作为演化博弈模型的补充，直观地刻画了博弈参与者策略的演化过程。根据生产者责任延伸理论，生产高质量的自行车有利于环境。本研究将共享单车质量作为模型中共享单车企业的重要战略选择。进化博弈模型假设共享单车企业有两种策略，一种是批量生产耐用自行车，另一种是大批量生产低质量自行车。政府同样也有两种策略，正调控和负调控，来研究两个局中人初始策略的交互影响。此外，还对共享单车企业策略部分参数进行了敏感性分析。研究结果如下:

第一，经过演化稳定分析，得到了5个局部等效点，并在6种条件下得到了ESSs（稳定进化策略）;两个局中人的进化稳定策略都是明确而纯粹的，即生产耐用自行车或只施加积极调节。稳定状态的最终选择取决于局中人的综合实力。
第二，观察并验证了冲突解决过程的动态性和交互性。在冲突过程中，政府监管和共享单车企业兼顾自身和对方的利益，同时调解双方的关切。过程中的冲突管理模式是妥协行为。
第三，通过对参数的敏感性分析，共享单车企业的策略对生产低质量自行车的额外运营和维护成本最敏感。生产耐用自行车的可能性与运行和维修成本间是正向关系。当成本降低时，自行车共享公司将大大降低生产耐用自行车的可能性。更多的低质量自行车将被生产出来，更多的社会资源最终将被浪费。

文章来源：Yang, H., Hu, Y.M., Qiao, H.*, Wang, S.Y., Conflicts Between Business and Government in Bike Sharing System, International Journal of Conflict Management, 2020, DOI: 10.1108/IJCMA-10-2019-0191.

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